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The thrust of Mr. Mailander's article, Searching for Liquidity:
United States Exit Strategies for International Private Equity Invest-
ment' captures one of the single most important aspects of the private
equity industry, i.e., timely distribution of portfolio investment with
maximum valuation potential. This "exiting" issue has been one of
the key factors responsible for bringing the relatively young private
equity and venture capital industry into play as a major economic in-
vestment engine in the United States. Mr. Mailander is to be con-
gratulated for reintroducing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)
as a global liquidity vehicle for private equity and venture capital
transactions, benefiting worldwide entrepreneurs and fund
stakeholders.
Given my early involvement with the development of the United
States venture capital industry, this commentary offers some personal
thoughts and suggestions relative to Mr. Mailander's article. My
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comments will focus on (1) the development of private equity and
venture capital flows, internationally and in the United States; (2) the
technical use of ADRs and the potential of Global Depositary Re-
ceipts (" GDRs"), given the expanded world private equity and ven-
ture capital transaction markets; and (3) specific questions and sug-
gestions for the next step in evaluating ADRs and GDRs as global
liquidity vehicles and investment structures.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY AND
VENTURE CAPITAL FLOWS
Fifty years ago, the first publicly-owned institutional venture
capital organization, American Research and Development, was
formed in the United States to invest in people, ideas, and innova-
tion. At the same time, a similar group, named 3i, was formed in the
United Kingdom with the same purpose. Members of the venture
capital and private equity industry achieved success or failure based
on their ability to sell some of their portfolio in an initial public of-
fering at a substantial value over their original costs. Such return on
investment successes stimulated institutional investors, such as pub-
lic and private pension funds, to become limited partners in private
equity funds. This was based upon a fund manager's historic ability
to achieve "significant" returns, about 20-30 percent compounded,
over the 3-10 year life of a portfolio investment and, more impor-
tantly, over the life of the individual equity fund itself.
According to a study by the Staff of the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB Report), the private equity market consists of stakeholders op-
erating, investing, and supporting professionally managed equity in-
vestments in the unregistered securities of private and public compa-
nies.2 Professional management is provided by specialized
intermediaries and, to a limited extent, by institutional investors. Pri-
vate equity managers acquire large ownership stakes and take an ac-
tive role in monitoring and advising portfolio companies. The "ven-
ture capital" component of the private equity market represents
investments in earlier stage deals, thereby requiring greater monitor-
ing and financial support by fund management. Additionally, these
2. See George W. Fenn et al., The Economics of the Private Equity Market,
STAFF STUDY-BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, at 2
(Dec. 1995) [hereinafter FRB REPORT].
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investments, when successful, achieve substantially greater returns
for the greater risk taken compared to other fund "asset" classes.
During periods of significant economic health and buoyant stock
market activity, investment returns are enhanced to the extent that, in
cyclical periods of inactivity and recession, returns are variegated
based on patient illiquidity until the national economic and financial
health improves again. The traditional and mainstream financial fo-
cus on short-term minimal risk returns and assured spreads gives way
to more organized, high-risk portfolio management. This high-risk
portfolio management consists of hard charging entrepreneurial
teams seeking long-term success and maximum profit potential for
the value provided by equity fund managers and other investee
stakeholders.
The advent of a venture capital industry in the United States coin-
cided with the development of new industries such as electronics,
computers (hardware and software), biotechnology, healthcare, and
information technology. The venture capital industry also benefited
from the further development of traditional industries that have since
grown into strong national and international operations, i.e., retail
chains, office supplies, franchises, and even funeral homes.
Concomitant with the United States venture capital industry's
growth was the development of the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers Automated Quotations system (Nasdaq). The Nasdaq
serviced private equity backed portfolio firms with listings on an
electronic exchange. The Nasdaq exchange focuses on the firms'
smaller sizes and cost considerations compared with the larger firm
standards and costs of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In
addition, long-term backing by several venture funds tended to create
more stable initial public offerings (IPOs) and after-markets for new
issues. To entice investors, particularly institutional investors, to be-
come players in new industries and growth, some assurance of the
availability of a national mechanism for "exiting" investments, at
least during the 10-15 year tenure cycle of an individual private eq-
uity fund, was necessary.
The international component of the United States private equity
venture capital industry surfaced in the 1970s when the successful
managers of venture capital funds were able to persuade United
States and foreign institutional investors and high net worth indi-
1997]
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viduals to invest in their new venture and/or private equity fund. The
economic successes of such funds and their individual portfolio in-
vestments appeared to foreign partners as a new and alternative asset
investment class, capable of achieving greater returns than traditional
investment opportunities. These fund successes created interest in
new venture fund structures for investing in Europe. Additionally,
Europe's need for economic and technological growth stimulated
governments and private financial institutions to adopt incentives for
private equity investing.
The emergence of the United Kingdom and European venture
capital industry, in the early 1980s, paralleled what occurred in the
United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Diverse European law and
the historically low risk investment banking culture of Europe, how-
ever, resulted in some basic distinctions between United States and
European venture capital industries. For example, in Europe the
emerging private equity funds and their management had difficulty
achieving returns based on long-term investing in the "early" stages
of business development. These investment schemes were unlike the
traditional arbitraging of a fixed spread to achieve current income
streams. Legal, accounting, and tax standards required new thinking
and overhaul. Additionally, the stock exchange and capital market
systems of the United Kingdom and Europe had not changed suffi-
ciently to provide an active market exchange system to accommodate
emerging firms that were unable to meet the existing "major" ex-
change listing requirements. Thus, unless an investment was sold to a
synergistic business or back to management, private and public in-
vestors essentially had no exchange or market mechanism to find and
evaluate the growth firms' securities.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, enterprise, venture, and private
equity funds backed by organizations, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (AID) and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), were formed to support industry privati-
zation and investor wealth creation through new enterprise develop-
ment in the former Soviet countries and other developing nations
around the globe. These funds invested in new and existing busi-
nesses, both large and small. Even with the hundreds of millions of
dollars representing these new enterprises and venture capital funds,
the venture managers found that to support private investing to
document returns, they also needed to have a stable exiting source for
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their investments. The value added potential had to have quantifiable
and documented successes. The dilemma centered on how to attract
increased amounts of venture capital for growth, while creating
wealth for private investors. Regardless of the geographical locale,
however, motivated entrepreneurs did not lack commercial ideas. In-
stead, it was the equity investment process and infiastructure, com-
bined with seasoned portfolio management, that needed strong
backing.
As Mr. Mailander notes, the success of private equity and venture
capital funds depends on an "active listed" or "unlisted" securities
market-a bon marchd, an Easdaq or another such system- that can
be used by European countries to parallel what the stock exchanges,
such as the Nasdaq, have achieved.3 These fledging securities "see-
ond" markets have recently begun to make an impact, and the first
private equity fund life cycle is nearing for European and other ven-
ture partnerships and organizations. The listing of portfolio invest-
ments on an exchange market, where there are willing investors and
sellers, will substantiate the true valuation successes of private and
public equity funds in these emerging and growing markets in
Europe and around the world.
It is no coincidence that the fund managers of many substantive
international private equity funds were pioneers of the United States
venture capital movement. This relationship has resulted in a formal
and informal linkage in their overseas activities, an important ele-
ment in the new global investing market place. This has also led to
an evolving "transnational" deal making capability, as well as a
heightened need to assure an ability to liquidate deals in different
parts of the globe. These deals are based on liquid markets and po-
tential investor wealth in selected geographic areas with middle mar-
ket investment interest.
In the past five to seven years, United States stock market activity
has increasingly achieved an international business acceptance as the
most likely IPO venue for investors in foreign based issuers. The dif-
ficulty, as Mr. Mailander indicates, is that in the past there was a lack
of cohesive securities laws and information flow upon which United
States and global investors could rely. Historically, the complicated
3. See Mailander, supra note 1, at 82 (describing private equity and venture
fund reliance on second tier markets).
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standards for accounting, legal, and tax requirements in such trans-
actions made it too costly for the "smaller" issuers to achieve con-
sistency among investor potential countries. To some extent, the
early United States venture pioneers, the increasing acceptance of the
European Union, as well as the now "privatized" economies of the
former Soviet states, have, in the last five to eight years, made it po-
tentially easier to achieve uniformity and consistency in laws, regu-
lations, and standards. Governments now realize that the flow of in-
vestment capital is correlated with investor friendly changes in laws,
regulations, and standards that will bring comfort, rather than road-
blocks, to potential investors. Global economic needs and instant
electronic information flow have caused institutions and govern-
ments to dramatically rethink historic culture, legal precedents, secu-
rities trading and ownership barriers, and tax repatriation limitations.
For example, in October 1997, Coopers & Lybrand reported that
the European Commission published a communication on the practical
aspects of the introduction of the "euro" as the standard currency for the
European Union. . . . Member states have been requested to provide their
transition plans before the end of 1997 including statements in account-
ing, reporting and tax declarations in euro.4
While we certainly have not achieved a standard currency yet, we
can expect to achieve this by the 21st century. The currency stan-
dardization movement is accelerating at a much greater pace than the
efforts made to create an ADR, Special Drawing Rights System,
based on exchange rates for major currencies, as adopted by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund in 1969 to supplement its members' ex-
isting reserve assets. The great need is for global "equity."
II. THE USE OF ADRS AND THE
POTENTIAL OF GDRS
Why are we now focusing on such an arcane financial structure as
ADRs, as presented in Mr. Mailander's article, to provide an exit
mechanism?5 The reason for the importance of ADRs is that in to-
day's global atmosphere, ADRs may evolve as the international fi-
4. Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., INTERNATIONAL BRIEFINGs 41 (Oct. 1997).
5. See generally Mailander, supra note I (arguing that ADRs can provide an
alternate exit strategy in international private equity investment).
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nancial liquidity vehicle for the next several decades or until a glob-
ally acceptable currency evolves. With the rapid increase in Internet
commercial transactions, the time for a globally acceptable currency
may be sooner rather than later.
ADRs were first introduced in 1927 as the result of British laws
that prohibited British companies from registering their shares over-
seas, since shares were not allowed to leave the United Kingdom.
ADRs permitted access to United States investor funds as the United
States reluctantly became involved in global economics and politics.
Mailander establishes and defines the following regarding ADRs:
A foreign company seeking to access the United States market may make
a direct offering of its stock or utilize American Depositary Receipts
(ADRs). For the investor, ADRs offer the advantage of avoiding prob-
lems with currency translation, subjecting the investor to commissions in
both the home country and the United States, subjecting the investor to
tax and settlement practices in the foreign company's home country, and
avoiding United States restrictions on purchasing foreign securities im-
posed on such institutional investors as banks and money managers. The
United States depository bank for the ADRs assumes the responsibility
for collecting, converting to United States dollars, and distributing the
share dividends. The depository bank also provides investors with current
information about the foreign issuers and votes the securities at the direc-
tion of the investors. Additionally, the United States holders may freely
sell the ADRs or the underlying shares in the foreign market. These ad-
vantages enhance the receptivity of the United States investor to acquiring
the foreign company's securities.6
Mailander further elaborates that
As ADRs establish an increasing presence in the United States, it is criti-
cal to note that the investor possessed the choice either of a "sponsored"
or an "unsponsored" ADR. A sponsored ADR program involves a con-
tractual relationship between the foreign issuer and the United States de-
pository bank. The depositary agreement between the foreign issuer and
bank establishes the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to
the ADRs and the underlying securities. It also effectively becomes the
cornerstone to defining the relationship between these parties and the
shareholders. An unsponsored ADR program involves the development of
the United States market in the foreign issuer's securities, but without the
6. Mailander, supra note 1, at 83-84 (describing the advantages of the ADR)
(citations omitted).
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contractual consent of that foreign company. Both cases raise unique se-
curities law issues that require careful consideration by the foreign com-
pany and the United States depository bank.7
The United States banks and their international banking linkages
were the only way liquid international transactions could take place
with some assurance that volatile currency changes or other local fi-
nancial hazards could be overcome. Historically, the use of ADRs
was limited and usually utilized by large international corporations.
As private companies have grown through use of the global private
equity marketplace, the number of ADR transactions, as an accept-
able banking instrument with international legal precedents, has in-
creased. This has allowed foreign issuers to take advantage of inves-
tor potential, in the United States and worldwide, through the active
United States exchanges and unlisted securities systems.
Mr. Mailander points out that, with regard to the United States
stock market, "the first nine months of 1996 saw the creation of 151
new ADR programs from 46 countries, in comparison to 105 new
ADR programs from 31 countries in the first nine months of 1995." '
He further states that, "of those 151 programs, 74 involved initial
public offerings which raised $7.4 billion, with the remaining $2.9
billion being raised through secondary offerings of existing ADR
programs." 9 As another indicator of the growth in the use of ADR
offerings, "in 1992, the Nasdaq listed 87 ADR issuers, while the
New York Stock Exchange listed 82, and the American Stock Ex-
change listed eight. By 1995, the Nasdaq presented 112 ADR offer-
ings, the NYSE noted 166, and the American Stock Exchange listed
seven." 
10
Numa Financial Systems Ltd. quantifies the ADR market as cur-
rently in excess of 1,500 ADRs from over 50 countries." The major-
ity of these ADRs are traded over-the-counter. Numa also indicates
that there are very few banks acting as depositories. The Bank of
New York is one such depository, accounting for approximately 60%
7. Id. (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 85.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Global Investor (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http://www.global-investor.
com/adr/index.htm >.
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of all ADR issues.
Focusing on the United States private equity industry growth and
its liquidity needs, the FRB Report observes the following: "From
1980 to 1994, the amount of capital under management by the or-
ganized private equity market increased from roughly $4.7 billion to
about $100 billion." 12 During that period, the venture capital compo-
nent of the private equity market jumped from $1.7 billion in 1980 to
$30 billion in 1994.13 Today, venture capital represents between $40
and $45 billion under professional management. 4
Other data shows that, from 1982 to 1992, technology related IPOs
climbed from $525 million to $3.8 billion and then declined to $2.6
billion by 1994.15 However, technology IPOs jumped to $8.1 billion
in 1995, $11.3 billion in 1996, and to more than $3.5 billion in the
first 8 months of 1997.16 Narrowing the IPOs to only those that were
financed specifically by the venture capital industry, "venture
backed" IPOs increased from 167 deals in 1992 to an all-time high
of 260 deals in 1996 with the first half of 1997 showing only 64
venture backed deals. 17 This shows that the growth and timing of li-
quidity, necessary to achieve substantial fund returns for investors,
are part of the venture capital funding processes and cycles. These
liquidity valuations must be sustained over long periods of time.
Globally, ADRs can become an essential part of the private equity
success story for both emerging markets and growth sectors of more
seasoned economies.
Europe and Asia, distinct international private equity/venture
capital markets, illustrate the significant rise in private equity capital
under management. The total European venture funds raised in 1992
were 38.5 billion ecu or $34.7 billion. By 1995, the total cumulative
funds raised grew to 50 billion ecu or $44 billion. European venture
investments increased from 6,197 deals in 1992 to 4,955 deals in
1995. The European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) indicated
that European private equity managers raised $7.9 billion in 1996, a
12. FRB REPORT, supra note 2, at 65.
13. See id
14. See id
15. See George (Chip) Vetter, Remarks at the 1997 Venture Capital Institute
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significant increase from the $4.4 billion raised in 1995." For Europe
in 1996, seed and start-up private equity investing accounted for
18%, buyouts represented 21%, expansion stage investing repre-
sented 51%, and the remaining 10% was in other types of private eq-
uity investing. Fifteen years ago, the amount of such venture funds
under professional management and their deal flow was relatively
negligible and certainly not considered an industry.
Turning to Asia, the venture capital and private equity funds under
professional management grew from $31.0 billion to $33.4 billion
between 1994 and 1995. When the Japanese venture groups are ex-
cluded, the rest of Asia soars 41% from $13.2 billion in 1994 to
$18.6 billion in 1995. Asian venture capital investments totaled $1.2
billion in 1992 and increased to $5.5 billion in 1995. Again, looking
back just 10 years, we find the very beginning of a private equity in-
dustry in Asia. The Asian Venture Capital Journal published its first
issue in January 1988.19
Looking beyond the recent setback in Asian stock markets, the
long-term nature of private equity investment potential still remains
in its infancy. For example, the Malaysian Exchange of Securities
Dealing and Automated Quotations Board (MESDAQ) opened on
October 6, 1997 with trading slated to begin in February 1998. A
Coopers & Lybrand report stated that "MESDAQ will ... provide
the high technology based companies as well as other small and me-
dium sized enterprises with an inexpensive means of raising capital
and encourage more venture capital financing and expansion pro-
grams." 20
Furthermore, Coopers & Lybrand indicates that a "second" tech-
nology based venture capital fund, capitalized at $100 million, will
be established to invest in the information technology, semiconduc-
tor, biotechnology, and healthcare industries over the next five
years.2 The public policy aim is to create a pool of technology based
entrepreneurs in Singapore by encouraging local start-ups and
building strong links to foreign companies and investors.
18. See EUR. VENTURE CAP. ASS'N, EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 56 (1994).
19. See Cumulative Index- 1988 (visited Nov. 5, 1997) <http://
www.asiaventure.com/Avcj/cumulative/cumu 1988.html>.
20. See Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 5, at 25.
21. See id. at 29.
[13:109
POTENTIAL EXITING THROUGH ADRS
The United States, as the most dominant private equity and ven-
ture capital market, has nearly $45 billion under professional man-
agement. These managers invested nearly $10 billion in 1996, and, in
the first half of 1997, investments into new and renewed enterprises
amounted to $5 billion. Clearly, these are historically peak times that
may not last. The importance of universal liquidity instruments to tap
growing capital markets, however, cannot be understated.
Judging from the public and private funds sponsoring and backing
the development of Russia and the former Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) countries through AID, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and private equity inves-
tors, we can estimate that there is more than $45 billion under man-
agement, more than equaling the current United States funds under
professional management. From a worldwide perspective, it is inter-
esting to note that in terms of IFC multinational private sector ven-
ture capital investing, as of 1995, there were 83 venture capital and
private equity funds with $685 million in IFC investment and $4.4
billion in outstanding commitments. As of October 1997, IFC backed
venture and private equity backed funds rose to 91% with $700 mil-
lion invested and $5.2 billion in outstanding commitments. Taking
Asia, Latin America, and Africa as a whole, with regard to profes-
sionally managed venture capital and private equity funds, we can
estimate another $35 to $40 billion. Thus, with nearly $130 billion of
private equity and venture capital backing in some form of profes-
sionally managed funds, global liquidity is more than an occasional
transaction issue.
This worldwide proliferation of tens of billions of dollars of pri-
vate equity and venture capital funds is now at a scale where fund in-
vestors and partners need a reliable, global structure for their portfo-
lio issuers that will provide the maximum potential for liquidity and
valuation. Depositary Receipts (DRs) offer an exit mechanism for
this investment. The Banker's Trust Internet site characterizes DRs
as follows: "[t]he Depositary Receipt trades and settles in a market
other than that of the issuing entity and the terms of the Depositary
Receipt may differ from the underlying security with respect to: base
currency, denomination, maturity, tax treatment, ownership rights,
settlement practices and return on investment."' Depositary Re-
22. What are Depositwy Receipts? (visited Nov. 5, 1997) <http'//
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ceipts can be launched as part of a public or private offering, or they
can be created without an offering to represent currently traded secu-
rities. They are often used to overcome obstacles that issuing compa-
nies may face in selling their securities to their targeted investors.
The following characteristics are representative of DRs:
Ownership Restrictions
• Limited foreign ownership in some countries
" Certain national limitations on bearer securities




* Certificate form (bearer vs. registered underlying securities)
" Lack of local market liquidity
• Regulatory Restrictions
A Depositary Receipt is generally a tradable instrument, which is
usually but not necessarily, listed on an internationally recognized
stock exchange and is issued by a depository to an investor. The DR
evidences the deposit of the underlying security with a local custo-
dian appointed by the depositary. Additionally, the DR indicates the
terms and conditions upon which such securities are to be held by a
custodian for and on behalf of the investors. DRs have been issued
both in definitive bearer form with coupons attached, and in regis-
tered form. Following the trend towards "dematerialization," how-
ever, DRs are increasingly created in registered global note form and
held in nominee names within the clearing systems, where records of
ownership are maintained.
DRs enable an issuing company to place its equity or debt in a for-
eign market, thereby " internationalizing" the profile of the company
in its investor base and, at the same time, expanding its name recog-
nition. DRs can be used as a vehicle for corporate acquisitions and
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs).
www.bankerstrust.com/ms/dreceipt/depwhat.htm>.
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An "international" offering in DR form is distributed to interna-
tional investors by a global syndicate of financial institutions. The
markets in which the DRs are intended to be sold or traded are re-
flected in their name. Thus, Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs),
which are usually in registered form, are directed at international in-
vestors including Euromarket and certain United States investors.
International and European Depositary Receipts (IDRs and EDRs re-
spectively) are intended largely for Euromarket investors, while
ADRs have been created for United States investors wishing to in-
vest in shares of non-United States companies.
The evolution of GDRs, as an "internationalization' of the DR
structure, is a sign that global liquidity and uniformity has multi-
market potential when the equity markets of the United States are not
sustained in a current cycle. The use of a GDR approach by other
stock markets would enhance the investor and valuation potential of
growth enterprises seeking investors who reside in sustained growth
economies. It is important to note that in economies where verifiable
information history is sparse or nonexistent, the current market
valuation may be the best method of true valuation for investors.
An interesting article in the Wall Street Journal dated October 20,
1997,2 adds even greater support for the increasing internationaliza-
tion of private equities and the need for global liquidity instruments.
The California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS),
limited partners in United States and international private equity
funds, began
ramping up its overseas exposure in the late 1980s. In 1989, its goal was
to put 8% of its portfolio in international shares; that target was increased
to 20% in 1995, with a three year period to achieve it. Money invested in
foreign shares has risen from $8 billion at the end of June 1993 to nearly
$24 billion as of June 30, 1997. By the end of July, CALPERS was within
a whisker of its 20% target, with 19.6% of its portfolio in foreign shares,
compared with 44.8% in United States shares .... CALPERS seeks mar-
kets based on a variety of factors that include political stability, eco-
nomic-growth prospects, and stock-market trading environment. For ex-
ample, CALPERS consultants have recommended against investments in
India, primarily because of the lack of liquidity and poor settlement sys-
tem. In 1994, 80% of trades in India failed to be completed, according to
23. Sara Webb, Calpers Sees New Targets Overseas, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
1997, at Cl.
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the consultants, Wilshire Associates ... CALPERS decided to tackle cor-
porate governance issues in Britain, France, Germany and Japan first be-
cause these are the countries where it has its biggest holdings."
It should be noted that 70% of the CALPERS overseas invest-
ments are indexed or passively managed. Nonetheless, a substantial
amount remains in active professionally managed private equity and
venture capital funds. The step toward international private equity
investing would not have been undertaken twenty years ago, during
the "prudent man" and "plan assets" limitations era. That era was
marked by public pension fund managers responsible for the long-
term well being of their retired employees. This is indeed a new era
which requires constant verifiable information, uniform securities
and tax treatments, and clear standards that are acceptable across
multi-country borders for the settlement of transactions. The need for
consistency for the smaller, middle market transactions being pur-
sued by private equity and venture capital managers in the interna-
tional arena is much greater.
As discussed by the Global Investor, ADRs may have been origi-
nally devised for United States investors, but all of their attractions
are equally applicable for foreign investors. For example, an investor
in Kuwait may be interested in buying shares in Telefonica De Ar-
gentina, in which case the United States traded Depositary Receipts
may be more attractive than dealing directly in the Argentinean mar-
ket. In addition to the advantages listed above, the investor can ana-
lyze price history charts and follow real-time prices (as with any
other United States security), transaction fees may be less, and the
foreign currency investment may be more competitive than convert-
ing funds directly to Argentine Dollars.
In an illustration of Russian structured ADR deals, the September
1997 issue of The Russian reports that
in the next several months, investors may get the chance to buy into Rus-
sian banking more easily as RCB (Russian Central Bank) restrictions are
relaxed and more ADRs appear on the United States equity market. The
ADR route has been by far the most popular method for channeling
Western investment into restricted, emerging market industries. Already,
Inkombank and Vozrozhdenyie offer a New York - listed ADR and it is
24. Id.
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anticipated that the Menatep bank will soon follow. These three, it is ex-
pected, will soon gain RCB approval to hold 3% of their capital in foreign
owned ADRs.'
The article also quotes a Baker & McKenzie partner as suggesting
that "setting up an ownership vehicle to make a local investment is
bread and butter work for us not just in Moscow, but throughout
Eastern Europe."26
Thus, ADRs have become part of acceptable private ownership re-
structuring for transactions in countries such as Russia and Eastern
Europe where there are presently restrictions on foreign ownership.
These countries seek western investors and have established country
specific equity funds, the investee issuers of which seek liquidity
potential.
HI. QUESTIONS & SUGGESTIONS FOR
EVALUATING ADRs
Mr. Mailander's article would have been of even greater future
value if more details and information on ADRs and GDRs were
analyzed to determine if there is truly a global liquidity market place
for investors and growth companies using such banking depositary
instruments and agreements. Also, attention should be paid to
whether venture backed securities can find a liquidity niche for the
venture and institutional investor through ADRs and GDRs. Can
transnational private deal making be enhanced using a more efficient
and less costly ADR or GDR instrument? What improvements, on a
global scale, need to be made in these depositary arrangements? Are
there changes in securities law, banking requirements, tax stipula-
tions, and universal GAAP standards that can make ADRs or GDRs
more efficient and less costly for small and middle market transac-
tions? Another interesting future study would be a comparison of the
use of ADRs by "venture backed," middle market, or emerging for-
eign issuers as opposed to major international corporations and oli-
gopolistic industries. Can private equity or venture funds or their af-
filiates act as "unsponsored" ADRs or third party holders of issuer
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shares?
Finally, what is the real incremental value added to the long-term
institutional and individual investors of private equity funds in using
ADRs or GDRs to overcome cyclical downturns in overheated stock
markets and achieve the superior returns they expect in a 10 to 15
year professional portfolio? What are the true direct and indirect
technical costs and premiums for such transactions from the inves-
tors' and issuers' standpoints?
These are indeed difficult questions that we must begin to answer.
If the flow of new enterprise ideas and all the stakeholders that bene-
fit from such potential cannot be seeded and fertilized by profes-
sional investors in that market, we can only retreat rather than move
boldly into the next century.
